






Restriction of Russian information and cultural content  
in Ukraine: conventional measurement 
 
Abstract: In the conditions of a hybrid war, information warfare is an 
important component. In connection with Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the 
latter is forced to seriously restrict the dissemination of Russian information and 
cultural content in Ukraine, which is criticized by some democratic institutions. In 
this regard, it is necessary to assess the legitimacy of these restrictions in the 
context of Article 10 “Freedom of Expression” of the 1950 Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Crimea and the Donbass undermines 
the foundations of security throughout the world and requires reflection not only 
and, perhaps, not so much by Ukrainian society as outside of Ukraine, since the 
aggressor disseminates a large amount of unreliable information. Important 
resolutions have been fixed in the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) of 12.10.2016, in particular: PACE reiterates its 
position that the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation (RF) and the 
military intervention of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine violate international law 
and principles, Supported by the Council of Europe (CoE), as referred to in 
Assembly resolutions 2112 (2016); 2063 (2015); 1990 (2014); 1988 (2014) (Item 
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2); “DNR” and “LNR”, created with the support and control of the Russian 
Federation, do not have any legitimacy in accordance with Ukrainian or 
international law (Item 3); the well-documented role of the Russian military in 
taking control and control of these regions is confirmed, despite strong resistance 
to the legitimate authority of Ukraine, and the complete dependence of the “DNR” 
and “LNR” on the Russian Federation in terms of material, technical, financial and 
administrative (Item 5) (Cited by source [1]). 
Similar conclusions were drawn by the international competent bodies 
regarding the role of Armenia in the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 
(“NKR”). Thus, in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 
16.06.2015 on the case “Chiragov and Others v. Armenia” (Application 
№ 13216/05)” it is stated that “all of the above reveals that the Republic of 
Armenia, from the early days of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has had a 
significant and decisive influence over the “NKR”, that the two entities are highly 
integrated in virtually all important matters and that this situation persists to this 
day. In other words, the “NKR” and its administration survives by virtue of the 
military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, 
consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
surrounding territories, including the district of Lachin” (Item 186); occupation 
within the meaning of the 1907 Hague Regulations exists when a state exercises 
actual authority over the territory, or part of the territory, of an enemy state. The 
requirement of actual authority is widely considered to be synonymous to that of 
effective control (Item 96) (Cited by source [2]). 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights actually recognized the 
occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan (“NKR”) by Armenia. It follows 
that Ukraine and Azerbaijan have much in common in solving problems of security 
and territorial integrity. According to the professor of the Sukhumi State 
University (Tbilisi) E. Kavtaradze, “the decision of the Ukrainian crisis will 
favorably affect the settlement of conflicts in the territories of Azerbaijan and 
Georgia”. “If the fate of Ukraine is resolved positively, then the solution of the fate 
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of conflicts in the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia will also be positive”, – he 
told “Interfax-Azerbaijan” [3]. As the Azerbaijani authors point out, “the 
occupation by Russia of Ukraine's territory creates the threat of repetition of 
similar steps against Azerbaijan” [4]. At the same time, some Azerbaijani authors 
see “the machinations of America” in the Ukrainian conflict, producing 
corresponding parallels with Azerbaijan [5]. Therefore, an objective analysis of the 
laws of social development in Ukraine is relevant for the public of Azerbaijan. 
Separate questions of the problem posed concerning the limitation of Russian 
information and cultural content were considered by the author in her article [6]. 
The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, whose presence 
(aggression) is recognized at the international level, in particular in the PACE 
Resolution of 12.10.2016, mentioned above, has such an essential component as 
«information war». As noted in the work [7], the anti-Ukrainian propaganda 
campaign revealed the insufficient formation of scientific and methodological 
grounds and explanations for actions in similar situations, demonstrated weak 
coordination of actions of state authorities, civil society, expert and scientific 
communities, journalists to counteract such campaigns. The purpose of the 
information war is to weaken the moral and material forces of the opponent or 
competitor and strengthen our own [7, p. 137]. Such insufficient attention to the 
information security of the country is Ukrainian scientist, Doctor of Law I. Sopilko 
called “epochal humanism” [8]. For the sake of justice, we must admit that this 
state of affairs is largely due to the fact that Ukraine too trustingly relied on the so-
called Budapest Memorandum signed by the United States, Great Britain, Russia 
and Ukraine, by which the first three countries as the largest nuclear powers 
guaranteed territorial integrity, economic security and non-use Any weapon against 
Ukraine [9]. Unfortunately, at the moment these guarantees remain a fiction. 
Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) 
A. Turchynov notes that the hybrid war paradigm is aimed at undermining and 
destroying the entire complex of social relations in the object of aggression, 
destroying the will to resist, including through information operations [10]. Israeli 
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military instructor and political scientist Zvi Arieli points out that information is an 
inseparable part of any military campaign. Due to the fact that many modern wars 
are often not conducted on total destruction, and their goals are limited political 
achievements, information can play a decisive role both at the operational or 
operational-tactical level, and in terms of consolidating the results of the military 
company in legal and international Political plan [11]. 
Information and cultural components of warfare were mentioned in the 
treatise of the ancient Chinese philosopher and military leader Sun Tzu (VI century 
BC): “undermine the prestige of the leadership of the enemy and expose him at the 
right time to condemn the public”; “use for this purpose cooperation with the most 
vile and vilest people”; “fetter the will of the enemy's soldiers with songs and 
music»; «do everything possible to devalue the traditions of your enemies and 
undermine their faith in their gods” [12]. Thus, in a country that resists aggression, 
there is a natural need for restrictions and prohibitions on these impacts. However, 
these restrictions or prohibitions may face objections inherent in a democratic 
society. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the acceptability of restrictions and 
prohibitions on relevant information and cultural content in a democratic society. 
With all due respect to freedom of expression, freedom to disseminate and 
receive information, these freedoms are not absolute. Thus, in the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789, Article 11), which remains 
an integral part of the modern Constitution of France, it is stated: «Free 
communication to other thoughts is one of the precious human rights; So every 
citizen can freely express, write, print, bearing responsibility for the abuse of this 
freedom in cases prescribed by law» (highlighted by the author). In the decision of 
the US Supreme Court in the case of “Roth v. United States” states that “ it is 
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment (to the US 
Constitution – the author's note) was not intended to protect every expression”. 
In the decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of “FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation” recognized that the “content of respondent's broadcast, which was 
„vulgar‟, „offensive‟, and „shocking‟, is not entitled to absolute constitutional 
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protection in all contexts; it is therefore necessary to evaluate the FCC's (Federal 
Communications Commission – the author's note) action in light of the context of 
that broadcast”. 
The European standard for ensuring freedom of speech and their limitations is 
set forth in Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. This article includes two parts: 
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
So, restrictions are possible, if they are established by law, necessary in a 
democratic society and applied, in particular, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity and/or public security. Consider in this light the legality of 
restrictions on information and cultural content of Russian origin and / or pro-
Russian content. 
Regarding the first criterion of restrictions – the establishment of the law – it 
should be noted that even in the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine, 
approved by Presidential Decree No. 514/2009 of 08.07.2009, threats to the 
information security of Ukraine, in particular, recognized negative information 
influences aimed at undermining Constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and inviolability of Ukraine's borders; use of the media (mass media), as 
well as the Internet to promote separatism on ethnic, linguistic, religious and/or 
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other grounds; Dissemination of values and ways of life in the media, the cult of 
violence, cruelty, pornography, disregard for human and national dignity, etc. In 
the recommendations of the parliamentary hearings on “Problems of the 
development of Ukrainian book publishing, book distribution and the prospects of 
supporting book reading in Ukraine” approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine of November 19, 2013, No. 695-VII, in particular, attention was 
paid to the decline in the competitiveness of the Ukrainian book and the rapid 
filling of most of the genre niches of the Ukrainian book market by an imported 
book, mainly from the Russian Federation. However, due to a false sense of 
“epochal humanism”, these threats were not fixed and embodied legislatively. And 
only when, due to the aggression of the Russian Federation, the threats were 
justified, a number of relevant laws were adopted. Really Ukrainian law and 
practice went through the application of such prohibitions (restrictions), namely: 
retransmission of Russian broadcasters; Broadcasting (distribution) of TV and 
radio products produced by the Russian Federation; Import from the territory of the 
aggressor state, as well as temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, publishing 
products, which can be distributed in the territory of Ukraine; Use of certain topics 
that are harmful to the national security of Ukraine, in the national television and 
radio product, in other media, including print media. Thus, the laws of Ukraine 
prohibit the dissemination in any way of Russian information and cultural content 
that popularizes or propagates the organs of the aggressor state and their individual 
actions justifying or recognizing the legitimate occupation of the territory of 
Ukraine, namely: the use of television and radio organizations to broadcast 
television programs produced after 01.08.1991. (The Law of Ukraine (hereinafter 
referred to as LU) “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, Part 2, Article 6), the 
distribution and demonstration of films with content on the subject matter (LU “On 
Cinematography”, Article 15-1), Materials in printed mass media (LU «On Press 
in Ukraine», Article 3) and book editions (Law on Publishing, Articles 28, 28-1). 
In addition, the norm of part 2 of Article 6 of the LU “On Television and Radio 
Broadcasting» prohibits the broadcasting of audiovisual works (films, telecasts, 
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except for information and information-analytical telecasts), one of the participants 
of which is a person listed in the list of persons posing a threat to the national 
security of Ukraine. 
Thus, these bans are provided for by law. That is, if, for example, the Russian 
TV channel demonstrates a map of Ukraine without the Crimea, then such a 
demonstration is aimed at securing this fact in the minds of the population and 
directly contradicts the norms of Ukrainian legislation, and if this channel 
otherwise can not by virtue of the legislation of the Russian Federation, then he has 
nothing to do In the television space of Ukraine. 
At the same time, there are not enough similar restrictions (prohibitions) in 
the Law on Information Agencies regarding Russian news agencies and 
information originating from these agencies. After all, these are the same Russian 
news agencies that massively produced false and propaganda „news‟ anti-
Ukrainian orientation: „crucified boy‟; “the mother of the said crucified boy, who 
was tied to a tank and dragged across the square”; „two slaves‟; “gnawed bullfinch, 
unlike the tomtit of patriotic (yellow-blue – author's note) colors”; “drunken 
Negroes dance on Ukrainian tanks”; “Yatsenyuk (ex-Prime Minister of Ukraine – 
note of the author) fought in Chechnya and participated in the torture and 
execution of Russian prisoners of war”; “Avdeevka is shelled by the Ukrainian 
army (which controls this city and provides life there – the author's note)” and 
others. Coordinator of the International Coalition “Stop Fascism in Russia” 
G. Obukhov calls such a submission of information «information terrorism”. “By 
distorting the facts and falsifying the events”, – the expert points out, – information 
terrorists affect the consciousness of people on a much larger scale than the plastid 
explosion (explosives are – the author's note), and this entails far more tragic 
consequences» [13]. There is no reason to allow these agencies to legitimately 
distribute this information in Ukraine (and in the rest of the world). Thus, the 
representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, Ambassador V. Yelchenko in his 
address to the UN on May 11, 2016 drew attention to the fact that “the cruel and 
vicious propaganda spread by the state-run media in Russia is one of the main 
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elements of the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation. There is a need to 
combat such phenomena as state propaganda of intolerance and hatred” [14]. Film 
director V. Mansky notes that Russian “propaganda not only gave birth to a war, it 
constantly heats up... while in Russia, it is difficult to resist this common absolute 
space of unlimited lies” [15]. 
With regard to the analysis of the legitimacy of restrictions on two other 
criteria (legitimate aim and necessity in a democratic society), we will consider the 
correspondence to these criteria in a relationship. 
So, the doctor of legal sciences V. Lipkan points to the so-called white 
(formally – legal) hostile propaganda – frankly disloyal to the target entity, which 
is conducted by any media through official channels. On TV channels and in other 
state-owned media of the Russian Federation, there is an ongoing falsification of 
information, discrediting top officials in order to form a negative attitude, in 
particular to Ukraine... In fact, propaganda is a method of information struggle that 
provides for an active offensive information impact on the object with the aim of 
Making predetermined changes in the information space, which causes the 
corresponding changes in the reality space [16]. 
In the article mentioned above [7, p. 140] it is noted that in the information 
war against Ukraine, the Russian Federation applies practically the whole arsenal 
of influence on people's consciousness. In particular, observers note that, for 
example, all 23 years of Ukraine's independence on Crimean television anti-
Ukrainian propaganda was conducted. 
The Russian journalist A. Babchenko writes: “Putin's propaganda got all the 
nastiness out of people, turned all the worst into a good place, allowed murder, 
xenophobia, obscurantism, persecution, harassment, hatred, aggression, racial 
intolerance... – and it turned out to be incredibly effective... I am almost certain 
that not a single „our Crimea‟ (the support of the citizens of the Russian Federation 
for the seizure of the Crimea – the author's note) would not have been possible 
without all these serials militia, investigators, murder, kidnapping, brigade, killers, 
corpses, „investigation‟ about maniacs, about child abusers, about human meat in 3 
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liter cans, constant pedaling of the dark sides of life” [17]. Obviously, it was no 
coincidence that in 2004 the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin spoke 
out against the restrictions in the broadcast of scenes of violence on Russian 
television, noting in particular that as a result of such a ban “the patriotic education 
of minors will suffer, largely related to the demonstration of films about the 
exploits and courage of our compatriots” [18]. 
It should be noted here that, on the contrary, the Council of Europe has 
repeatedly spoken out for limiting the propaganda of violence and cruelty, in 
particular, in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe No. R (89) 7 of 27.04.1989 “On the principles of distributing video 
recordings of violent, cruel or pornographic content”, No. R (97) 19 of 30.10.1997 
“On the display of violence in electronic media”, No. R (97) 20 of 30.10.1997 “On 
inciting hatred”. As for Ukraine, this propaganda, which was mainly imported into 
Ukrainian television by the Russian television and video product, was not timely 
assessed by the Ukrainian authorities as threatening, not only in terms of threat to 
public morality, but also in terms of a threat to national security. 
Objective research indicates that separatism and consistent anti-Ukrainianness 
did not have any real roots in the Donbass or in the Crimea, but were introduced 
there from without, by Russian propaganda. So, the Russian researcher 
A. Akhmetov (2013) comes to the conclusion that the strengthening of institutions 
of power and the establishment in Ukraine of democratic procedures and ways of 
interaction between political institutions allowed to deactivate the problem of 
Russian separatism in the Crimea [19]. G. Starovoitova notes that the rights of the 
Russian-speaking majority in the Crimea are not violated by the Ukrainian 
authorities and the Crimea's problems are solved «without calling Ukraine's 
sovereignty»... but many people in Russia, including few influential politicians, did 
not want to accept the idea that Crimea is part of a neighboring state [20]. This 
same propaganda line continues even further (2017). Calling for the seizure of the 
territories of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the „figures‟ of the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation directly indicate that “it is necessary to conduct propaganda, 
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not everything is lost in the so-called neighboring countries... The borders are not 
eternal, and we will return to the borders of the Russian state” [21]. A resident of 
Donetsk recalls the events of the „Russian Spring‟ in 2014: “I remember this 
„referendum‟. A few days before, according to one of the Russian TV channels, the 
news anchor told that in Donetsk marks are placed on the homes of Russian-
speaking citizens. My wife and I giggled then. What nonsense!.. Then this rubbish 
was seriously told to each other by people in a referendum... And we suddenly 
realized that the people began to go crazy in mass” [22]. 
Thus, the Russian propaganda has inflicted and causes a huge damage to the 
national security of Ukraine, in fact leads to the death of people, that is why the 
restriction of such propaganda corresponds to the legitimate goal – ensuring 
national security – and is necessary in a democratic society. 
It should also be noted that Ukraine and the Russian Federation are formally 
members of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. However, the 
Russian Federation has not ratified this Convention, does not consider itself bound 
by its terms. Thus, although according to Article 4 of this Convention, the parties 
to the Convention guarantee freedom of reception and do not limit the 
retransmission of software services in their territory that meet the conditions of the 
Convention, based on the principle of reciprocity, Ukraine is not obliged to adhere 
to this Convention in relation to the Russian Federation. For example, by analogy 
with Part 9 of Article 13 LU “On advertising”, broadcasting (retransmission) of 
advertisements, which is contained in the programs and programs of foreign TV 
and radio broadcasting to the territory of Ukraine, if foreign TV and radio 
organizations DO NOT fall under the jurisdiction of EU member states or states 
that have ratified the Convention, – PROHIBITED. 
It should be said that such challenges arose not only in front of Ukraine. So, 
the above-mentioned expert G. Obukhov points out that “today for the West and, 
in particular, for the United States, comes from Russia a threat that no one has 
dared to correctly qualify, and then begin to seek a solution to a very large problem 
and eliminate this threat. What Russia does in the information space abroad is no 
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propaganda, it is real information terrorism and information diversions. 
Propaganda is the promotion and upholding of some ideologies or ideas that can be 
both political and non-political. Information terrorism is the deliberate distortion of 
facts and the falsification of real events” [13]. In this sense, it becomes quite 
understandable the statement of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation 
S. Shoigu during the speech in the State Duma of the Russian Federation that the 
troops of information operations have been established in the military department 
of the Russian Federation [23]. 
The well-known Russian journalist and blogger Sasha Sotnik comments: “A 
civilized society has every possible leverage to fight the [Putin propaganda virus]. 
The first step was already made by Great Britain, having closed all accounts of the 
Putin propaganda channel "Russia Today". At the same time, "freedom-loving 
moans" [about freedom of speech] should not be misled by the Western public, 
since fascist propaganda is not only possible but necessary to be banned and 
eradicated by all possible means: close accounts, deny broadcasting licenses, expel 
propagandists with cameras and microphones – to your favorite "imperial 
homeland". Do not enter into a position, do not yield to screams and exhortations, 
and – especially – do not cooperate. In no case. Not allowed on the threshold. 
Drive into the neck from all sides. Propaganda of Putinism should be banned 
totally and legislatively”.  
Conclusions. The restriction of Russian information and cultural content in 
Ukraine as a country that has been aggressed by the Russian Federation and 
resisting this aggression is justified and permissible in the light of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as provided by 
law, corresponds to the legitimate goal of ensuring national security and is 
necessary in a democratic society. Sooner or later, the same problem will have to 
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